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Recently (Roca et al. (2010), we used the relationship with general intelligence (Spearman’s g) to deﬁne
two sets of frontal lobe or ‘‘executive’’ tests. For one group, including Wisconsin card sorting and verbal
ﬂuency, reduction in g entirely explained the deﬁcits found in frontal patients. For another group,
including tests of social cognition and multitasking, frontal deﬁcits remained even after correction for g.
Preliminary evidence suggested a link of the latter tasks to more anterior frontal regions. Here we
develop this distinction in the context of behavioural-variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a
disorder which progressively affects frontal lobe cortices. In bvFTD, some executive tests, including
tests of social cognition and multitasking, decline from the early stage of the disease, while others,
including classical executive tests such as Wisconsin card sorting, verbal ﬂuency or Trail Making Test
part B, show deﬁcits only later on. Here we show that, while deﬁcits in the classical executive tests are
entirely explained by g, deﬁcits in the social cognition and multitasking tests are not. The results
suggest a relatively selective cognitive deﬁcit at mild stages of the disease, followed by more
widespread cognitive decline well predicted by g.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
The prefrontal cortex is a key element in the achievement
of effective behaviour and higher cognitive function. To assess
frontal lobe functions, clinical and experimental neuropsychology
(Spearman, 1904) have successfully designed many tests of
‘‘executive’’ processing, including the Wisconsin card sorting tests
(WCST), verbal ﬂuency, trail making test B (TMTB), and many
more. Quite commonly, however, patients with frontal pathology
have been described as presenting marked cognitive and beha-
vioural deﬁcits yet performing within an average range on
classical executive tests (Burgess, 2000; Eslinger & Damasio,
1985; Goldstein, Bernard, Fenwick, Burgess, McNeil, 1993;
Metzler & Parkin, 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). The results
suggest a degree of dissociation among frontal lobe functions,
only some of which are well captured in classical tests.
Recently (Woolgar et al., 2010), we developed this ﬁnding in a
study of executive impairments and loss of ‘‘general intelligence’’
or Spearman’s g. Studies using functional brain imaging link
conventional tests of g to activity in a speciﬁc network of frontal.008
, Capital Federal, BA,
cense. and parietal brain regions, including cortex along the inferior
frontal sulcus, the anterior insula/frontal operculum, the dor-
somedial frontal cortex including dorsal anterior cingulate and
pre-supplementary motor area, and cortex along the intraparietal
sulcus (Bishop, Fossell,a, Croucher, & Duncan, 2008; Duncan &
Owen, 2000; Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli,
1997). Damage within this same network predicts reduction in g
(Woolgar et al., 2010). In our study, we showed that g was a
substantial contributor to many frontal deﬁcits. Particularly, for
classical executive tasks, including the WCST and verbal ﬂuency,
deﬁcits in frontal lobe patients were entirely explained by their
loss of g. However, on a second set of frontal tasks, deﬁcits
remained even after g was statistically controlled. Included in
this latter group were tests of theory of mind and multitasking.
Tentatively, we linked deﬁcits in this second set of tests to
damage in anterior frontal cortex, in line with strong anterior
activity in functional imaging studies (Gilbert et al., 2006; though
note also involvement of anterior regions in classical tests of g, see
Christoff et al., 2001; Gla¨scher et al., 2010).
Here, we develop our previous conclusions in the context of
patients with the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia
(bvFTD), a degenerative disorder whose clinical manifesta-
tions include changes in personality, impaired social interaction,
disinhibition, deﬁcits in impulse control and loss of insight
(Hodges & Miller, 2001). Critically, bvFTD shows early
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frontal pole (Broe et al., 2003; Hornberger et al., 2010; Kipps,
Nestor, Fryer, & Hodges, 2007; Rosen et al., 2002; Seeley, 2009,
2008), and in part separate from the more dorsal and lateral
network that is supposedly linked to g. From a neuropsychological
perspective, in early stages of the disease, tests of social cognition
and multitasking have shown a greater sensitivity in the detection
of bvFTD than classical executive tests (Gleichgerrcht, Iba´n˜ez, Roca,
Torralva, & Manes, 2010; Rahman, Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers, &
Robbins, 1999; Torralva, Roca, Gleichgerrcht, Bekinschtein, &
Manes, 2009; Torralva et al., 2007). Only as the disease progresses
do classical executive tests, such as the WCST and verbal ﬂuency,
begin to decline (Miller et al., 1991; Neary, Snowden, Northen, &
Goulding, 1988; Torralva et al., 2009), possibly reﬂecting the more
advanced involvement of additional prefrontal areas (Williams,
Nestor, & Hodges, 2005). In a recent study (Torralva et al., 2009),
for example, we assessed a group of bvFTD with classical executive
tests and with an Executive and Social Cognition Battery, which
included theory of mind tests (mind in the eyes, faux pas), multi-
tasking (hotel task) and decision making (Iowa gambling task).
Patients were divided into two groups according to their general
cognitive performance. Low functioning patients – presumably
reﬂecting a more advanced state of the disease – differed from
controls on classical executive tasks and the Executive and Social
Cognition Battery. In contrast, only the latter showed deﬁcits in
high functioning patients.
Here, we tested the hypothesis that links to g help explain
the distinction between classical executive tests and those tests
which have shown greater sensitivity in the detection of early
bvFTD, including multitasking and social cognition. For these
early-declining tests, we predicted, deﬁcits arise in frontal net-
works not closely related to g, and accordingly should remain
even once g is statistically controlled. In contrast, for the classical
executive tests, likely impaired only in more advanced patients,
deﬁcits might be entirely explained by g. To test this hypothesis,
we re-analysed our previous data set on patients with bvFTD
(n¼35) and control subjects (n¼14). Conventionally, g can be
measured either using a standard psychometric test such as
Raven’s Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988) or simply by
averaging performance on a diverse battery of tasks; in practice,
these two approaches give largely similar results (Cattell, 1971),
and we used the latter method here. We thus asked which deﬁcits
in frontal tests remain, after correction for g as measured in a
general test battery (GTB).2. Material and methods
2.1. Subjects
Patients with a diagnosis of bvFTD (n¼35) according to the Lund and
Manchester criteria (Neary et al., 1998) were recruited as part of a broader
ongoing study on frontotemporal dementia. All patients gave informed consent
prior to inclusion and underwent a standard examination battery including
neurological, neuropsychiatric and neuropsychological examinations. Patients
were followed through time; all showed frontal atrophy on neuroimaging and
did not meet criteria for speciﬁc psychiatric disorders, thus avoiding the inclusion
of non-progressors or so-called ‘phenocopy’ cases in the analysed sample (Kipps
et al., 2007; Manes, 2012). When retrospectively analyzed, all of the patients
included in the study met the revised criteria for probable bvFTD (Rascovsky et al.,
2011).
Based on previous reports (Torralva et al., 2009), bvFTD participants were
further subdivided according to their cognitive performance. A patient was
included in the high functioning FTD (hf-FTD) group when he/she showed a score
above 86/100 (the standard cut-off for dementia) in the ACE (Mathuranath, Nestor,
Berrios, Rakowicz, & Hodges, 2000), a screening tool able to detect progression of
disease in FTD (Kipps, Nestor, Dawson, Mitchell, & Hodges, 2008) and which has
been demonstrated to correlate with the degree of atrophy found in the disease
(Kipps et al., 2007). When a patient showed a score below the cut-off in such test,
he/she was included in the low functioning FTD (lfFTD) group. This procedureresulted in 16 participants with ACE scores above the cut-off (hfFTD) and a group
of 19 participants with ACE scores below cut-off (lfFTD).The mean age of hfFTD
patients was 65.0 years (SD¼7.4) and mean years of education 13.8 (SD¼3.8). The
mean age of lfFTD patients was 69.1 years (SD¼5.7) and mean years of education
13.5 (SD¼5.2).
Healthy control subjects (n¼14) were recruited from the same geographical
area as the patients and were matched for age and level of education. The mean
age of controls was 65.5 years (SD¼6.5) and mean years of education 13.9
(SD¼3.1).
2.2. Neuropsychological assessment
2.2.1. Wisconsin card sorting test (Nelson, 1976)
For the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test we used Nelson’s modiﬁed version of the
standard procedure. Cards varying on three basic features – colour, shape and
number of items – must be sorted according to each feature in turn. The
participant’s ﬁrst sorting choice becomes the correct feature, and once a criterion
of six consecutive correct sorts is achieved, the subject is told that the rules have
changed, and cards must be sorted according to a new feature. After all three
features have been used as sorting criteria, subjects must cycle through them
again in the same order as they did before. Each time the feature is changed, the
next must be discovered by trial and error. Score was total number of errors, either
before successful completion of all six task stages, or after a maximum of 48 cards.
2.2.2. Verbal ﬂuency (Benton & Hamsher, 1976)
In verbal ﬂuency tasks, the subject generates as many items as possible from a
given category. We used the standard phonemic version, asking subjects to
generate words beginning with the letters F, A and S in successive blocks of
1 min/letter. Score was the total number of correct words generated.
2.2.3. Trail making test B (Partington & Leiter, 1949)
The trail making test consists of two parts. In the present study part B was
administered (TMTB). In this test the subject is required to draw lines sequentially
connecting 13 numbers and 12 letters distributed on a sheet of paper. Letters and
numbers are encircled and must be connected alternatively (e.g., 1, A, 2, B, 3, C,
etc.). Score was the total time (s) required to complete the task, given a negative
sign so that high scores meant better performance.
2.2.4. Hotel task (Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt, & Robertson, 2002;
Torralva et al., 2009)
The task comprised ﬁve primary activities related to running a hotel (compil-
ing bills, sorting coins for a charity collection, looking up telephone numbers,
sorting conference labels, proofreading). The materials needed to perform these
activities were arranged on a desk, along with a clock that could be consulted by
removing and then replacing a cover. Subjects were told to try at least some of all
ﬁve activities during a 15 min period, so that, at the end of this period, they would
be able to give an estimate of how long each task would take to complete. It was
explained that time was not available to actually complete the tasks; the goal
instead was to ensure that every task was sampled. Subjects were also asked to
remember to open and close the hotel garage doors at speciﬁed times (open at
6 min, close at 12 min), using an electronic button. Of the several scores possible
for this task, we used time allocation: for each primary task we assumed an
optimal allocation of 3 min, and measured the summed total deviation (in
seconds) from this optimum. Total deviation was given a negative sign so that
high scores meant better performance.
2.2.5. Iowa gambling task (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000)
In the Iowa gambling task, subjects are required to pick cards from four decks
and receive rewards and punishments (winning and losing abstract money)
depending on the deck chosen. Two ‘risky’ decks yield greater immediate wins
but very signiﬁcant occasional losses. The other two ‘conservative’ decks yield
smaller wins but negligible losses that result in net proﬁt over time. Subjects make
a series of selections from these four available options, from a starting point of
complete uncertainty. Reward and punishment information acquired on a trial by
trial basis must be used to guide behaviour towards a ﬁnancially successful
strategy. Normal subjects increasingly choose conservative decks over the 100
trials of the task. Our score was the total number of conservative minus risky
choices. Data were available for all patients and 10 control subjects.
2.2.6. Faux pas (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998)
In each trial of this test, the subject was read a short, one paragraph story. To
reduce working memory load, a written version of the story was also placed in
front of the subject. In 10 stories there was a faux pas, involving one person
unintentionally saying something hurtful or insulting to another. In the remaining
10 stories there were no faux pas. After each story, the subject was asked whether
something inappropriate was said and if so, why it was inappropriate. If the
answer was incorrect, an additional memory question was asked to check that
basic facts of the story were retained; if they were not, the story was re-examined
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identiﬁed, or non-faux pas correctly rejected.
2.2.7. Mind in the eyes (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997)
This task consisted of 17 photographs of the eye region of different human
faces. Participants were required to make a two alternative forced choices that
best described what the individual was thinking or feeling (e.g., worried-calm).
The score was total number correct.
2.2.8. General test battery (GTB)
All participants were also assessed with a general test battery used to derive a
measure of g. This battery included Forward Digit Span task (Wechsler, 1997a),
Letters and Numbers (Wechsler, 1997a), logical memory test (Wechsler, 1997b),
Rey auditory verbal learning test (Rey, 1941), Rey complex ﬁgure test (Rey, 1941),
and Raven’s coloured progressive matrices (Raven, 1996). For this set of tests,
principal component analysis produced a ﬁrst component accounting for 62% of
the total variance. Loadings on this component were moderate to high for all tests
(range¼0.58–0.86). The g score for each participant (gGTB) was deﬁned as the
score on this ﬁrst principal component.
2.2.9. Language proﬁciency
Given that most tasks used in this study relied on language abilities, which are
known to be affected in bvFTD, all subjects were also assessed with tests of
language proﬁciency. Language assessment comprised tests of naming (a 20 item
version of the Boston naming test) (Kaplan, Goodglass, & Weintraub, 1983) and
semantic knowledge (pyramids and palm trees test) (Howard & Patterson, 1992).3. Results
Groups were well matched for age, F(2,46)¼1.34, P¼0.18, and
years of education, F(2,46)¼0.53, P¼0.95 (Table 1). For executive
tests and gGTB, the mean scores of each group are shown in Fig. 1.
For each executive test, groups were compared by analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with post hoc comparisons. Results areTable 1
Demographical, cognitive status and language proﬁciency data for controls, lfFTD and
Variables Controls (n¼14) lfFTD (n¼19) hfFT
Demographical data
Age 65.5 (6.5) 69.1 (5.7) 65.0
Education (years) 13.9 (3.0) 13.5 (5.2) 13.8
Cognitive status
MMSE 29.2 (1.0) 25.7 (3.2) 28.2
ACE 94.5 (5.3) 74.2 (8.4) 91.0
Language proﬁciency
Boston naming test 19.8 (0.4) 16.8 (3.6) 18.9
Pyramids and palm trees test 51.8 (0.3) 48.7 (3.8) 50.5
Values are shown as mean (SD). ACE¼Addenbrooke’s cognitive examination; MMSE¼
Fig. 1. Group performance on each task. Signiﬁcantsummarized in Table 2 (see also Torralva et al., 2009). Executive
tests showed two different proﬁles of impairment. For the
classical executive tasks, WCST, verbal ﬂuency, and TMTB, a mild
and non-signiﬁcant impairment in hfFTD patients became a
substantial deﬁcit in the lfFTD group. For remaining tasks – faux
pas, mind in the eyes, hotel task and IGT – deﬁcits were already
substantial in the hfFTD group, and only slightly more marked
for lfFTD.
For gGTB, ANOVA also showed signiﬁcant differences between
the 3 groups, F(2,46)¼40.7, Po0.01. On this measure, resembling
results for the classical executive tasks, hfFTD patients were
somewhat closer to controls than to lfFTD patients (Fig. 1), though
post hoc comparisons showed signiﬁcant differences between all
groups (hfFTD vs. controls, Po0.01; hfFTd vs. lfFTD, Po0.01;
lfFTD vs. controls, Po0.01).
Scatter plots relating gGTB to the three classical frontal tests
are shown in Fig. 2. For all classical executive tests, scores were
heavily dependent on gGTB, and once this inﬂuence was removed
by analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), group differences were no
longer signiﬁcant (Table 2). Regression lines in Fig. 2 come from
the standard ANCOVA model, reﬂecting the average within-group
association of the two variables and constrained to have the same
slope across groups. As calculated from the corresponding var-
iance terms of the ANCOVA, average within-group correlations
with gGTB were 0.33 for WCST, 0.45 for verbal ﬂuency, and 0.61
for TMTB.
Scatter plots relating gGTB to the other frontal tests are shown
in Fig. 3. For these tests results were very different. Except for
Mind in the Eyes, scores were barely related to gGTB, with
average within-group correlations of 0.08 for the Hotel Task,
0.18 for Iowa Gambling Task, 0.01 for Faux Pas, and 0.29 forhfFTD groups.
D (n¼16) Controls vs. lfFTD Controls vs. hfFTD hfFTD vs. lfFTD
(7.4) 40.1 40.1 40.1
(3.8) 40.1 40.1 40.1
(1.9) o0.01 40.1 o0.01
(2.6) o0.01 40.1 o0.01
(1.2) 40.01 40.1 0.03
(2.8) 0.02 0.74 0.22
mini-mental state examination.
differences are indicated by asterisks (po0.05).
Table 2
Signiﬁcance of group differences before and after gGTB was introduced as a covariate.
Variables Main effect of group before gGTB









group after gGTB was







WCST F¼18.6, Po0.01 o 0.01 0.09 o 0.01 40.1 40.1 40.1 40.1
Verbal ﬂuency F¼8.1, Po0.01 o 0.01 40.1 0.01 40.1 40.1 40.1 40.1
TMTB F¼16.9, Po0.01 o 0.01 0.07 o 0.01 40.1 40.1 40.1 40.1
Hotel Task F¼12.0, Po0.01 o 0.01 0.02 40.1 0.04 0.04 40.1 40.1
Iowa gambling task F¼21.7, Po0.01 o 0.01 o0.01 40.1 o0.01 o0.01 o0.01 40.1
Faux pas F¼23.5, Po0.01 o 0.01 o 0.01 0.08 o0.01 o0.01 o0.01 40.1
Mind in the eyes F¼15.6, Po0.01 o 0.01 o 0.01 40.1 0.06 40.1 0.06 40.1
a To compare performance between the groups a one-way ANOVA design with Bonferroni’s post hoc comparisons was used.
b Except for the Iowa gambling task (df¼2, 42).
c To compare performance between the groups a one-way ANCOVA design with Bonferroni’s post hoc comparisons was used.
Fig. 2. Scatter plots relating gGTB to the three classical frontal tests. Regression lines reﬂect the average within-group association of the two variables, as determined by
ANCOVA, constrained to have the same slope across groups.
Fig. 3. Scatter plots relating gGTB to the social cognition and multitasking tests. Regression lines reﬂect the average within-group association of the two variables, as
determined by ANCOVA, constrained to have the same slope across groups.
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left signiﬁcant group differences for 3 of the 4 tests, with the
exception being a value of P¼0.06 for mind in the eyes (Table 2).
As expected, groups also differed signiﬁcantly on tests of
language proﬁciency (Table 1), both on the Boston naming test,
F(2,46)¼7.12, Po0.01, and in the pyramids and palm trees test,
F(2,46)¼4.51, P ¼ 0.01. Within the patient group, no signiﬁcant
correlations were found between performance on executive and
language tests.4. Discussion
In the present study we aimed to investigate the relationship
between frontal deﬁcits and g in bvFTD. We derived a g score
(gGTB) for 35 bvFTD patients and 14 control subjects, all of whom
were also assessed with a variety of frontal tasks previously
reported as impaired in different stages of the disease. As
expected by the established progression of neuropathologicalchanges in bvFTD, classical executive tests showed a different
relationship with g than social cognition and multitasking tests
sensitive to early bvFTD. For three of the latter - Hotel Task, Iowa
Gambling Task, and Faux Pas -performance was only weakly
related to g, and even removing any inﬂuence of g, signiﬁcant
differences remained between patients and controls. A similar
trend was seen for the fourth test in this group, mind in the eyes.
For classical executive tests, the link to g was stronger, and group
differences were no longer signiﬁcant once the effect of g was
removed. In general, the performance of bvFTD patients on
executive tests was not signiﬁcantly related to language deﬁcits.
Our ﬁndings are largely compatible with those we previously
obtained in patients with focal frontal lesions (Roca et al., 2010).
In focal patients too, deﬁcits in classical executive tests (WCST,
verbal ﬂuency) were entirely explained by reduction in g, while
deﬁcits in multitasking and social cognition were not. While in
focal patients we presented data only on the WCST and verbal
ﬂuency, in the present study we also demonstrated that the TMTB
behaves similarly to those classical executive tests: once g is
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longer present.
An important difference between FTD and focal patients, however,
concerns the Iowa Gambling Task. In a previous study we found that
in patients with focal lesions, deﬁcits on the IGT were no longer
present once ﬂuid intelligence was included as a covariate, while in
the present patients, deﬁcits in this task far exceeded predictions
from g scores. These results are compatible with previous studies
showing prominent decision making deﬁcits in FTD (Gleichgerrcht
et al., 2010; Manes et al., 2011; Rahman et al., 1999; Torralva et al.,
2009, 2007). While the Iowa gambling task has been conventionally
linked to ventromedial frontal functions (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio,
& Anderson, 1994) further studies revealed that damage to other
regions within the frontal cortex could also affect performance on this
task (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Anderson, 1998; MacPherson,
Phillips, Della Sala, & Cantagallo, 2009; Manes et al., 2002). Such
results suggest a multicomponent test, and in this light, the different
results for focal and bvFTD patients may likely be traced to their very
different lesion characteristics. In our previous focal patients, there
were few cases of ventromedial damage; in this group, impairments
may be dominated by the general cognitive requirements of the Iowa
Gambling Task, and thus closely related to g. In bvFTD, in contrast, the
picture may be dominated by ventromedial frontal pathology, and by
speciﬁc deﬁcits in risky decision-making.
For clinical assessment of bvFTD, our data highlight the necessity
of including frontal functions that are not routinely considered yet are
crucial to competent everyday life performance, such as contextual
social cognition, multitasking and mentalizing (Burgess, Alderman,
Volle, Benoit, & Gilbert, 2009; Torralva et al., 2009). Moreover, the
early fronto-insular-temporal atrophy pattern of bvFTD (Seeley, 2008;
Viskontas, Possin, & Miller, 2007; Williams et al., 2005) seems to be
speciﬁcally associated with contextual integration processes recruited
during situated social and ecological cognition tasks (Iba´n˜ez & Manes,
2012). Thus, in the early phase, bvFTD would be a speciﬁc disorder of
contextual integration in social cognition domains (Iba´n˜ez & Manes,
2012). Our data, consistent with this hypothesis, showed impair-
ments in multitasking, decision making and theory of mind to be a
core domain of bvFTD, suggesting an early involvement of brain
networks engaged in situated-contextual cognition. This core set of
deﬁcits seem to be extended by later atrophy of a more dorsal and
lateral frontal network, associated with a general cognitive decline
and reduction in g.
Undoubtedly, the rather general cognitive functions reﬂected
in g will inﬂuence success in most or all cognitive tests. Removing
this inﬂuence, we suggest, may clarify the more speciﬁc impair-
ments that neuropsychological tests are generally intended to
measure. Here, we have shown that this procedure helps clarify
the progression of executive impairment in bvFTD. Speciﬁcally, it
distinguishes a group of early, relatively focal cognitive impair-
ments from a later, more global cognitive decline.Acknowledgments
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